Medical help reached him within about 45 seconds and stabilized him. He had two broken femurs (one open) and serious facial/cranial injuries. He was life-flighted out. He was taken off life support and passed away 2 days later.

He was jumping an elliptical canopy at a wing loading of 1.6:1. The report did not state how many jumps he had made on this canopy, but his total number of jumps make this an aggressive canopy choice. He may have been descending more quickly than he expected either in level flight, during the front-riser turn or both.

The report also did not mention whether the jumper was attempting a high-performance landing or simply attempting to land in the same direction as the other jumpers on the load. For whatever reason, the jumper initiated the final turn without sufficient altitude and struck the ground hard while still in a turn. The landing area was surrounded by open desert on three sides, which would have provided a flat, unobstructed landing area. The jumper could have abandoned plans to land in the main landing area at any point during the descent before initiating the fatal turn. The report also pointed out that the jumper could have made a 90-degree left turn instead and probably landed safely in a clear area.

Jumpers working toward a high-performance wing loading such as this should downsize in small increments and only after becoming thoroughly familiar with their current canopies. In general, jumpers should plan and follow landing patterns that provide safe approaches and landings, whether on the intended drop zone or into an alternate area. All turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.

USPA receives several reports each year involving jumpers who self-induce line twists from radical toggle input. Most of the incidents occur with enough altitude to allow the jumpers to kick out of the twists before reaching the ground; however, several have occurred at low altitudes, resulting in fatalities.

In this very serious predicament, the only viable option may have been to deploy the reserve canopy without releasing the main. The reserve then may have had sufficient time to inflate, stop the spin, slow the descent and possibly make the landing more survivable. The importance of not maneuvering into a line twist this low is obvious.

All jumpers should learn the limits of the equipment they choose to jump. Even larger parachutes at light wing loadings have been known to spin into line twist with an aggressive toggle turn. Category G of the Integrated Student Program contains training and exercises regarding rapid toggle turns designed to help jumpers learn the limits of each canopy they jump. Jumpers should perform all the exercises above 2,500 feet to allow enough altitude in case of an induced line twist and to provide the jumper with enough time and altitude to initiate emergency procedures.

A jumper should also consider the wing loading and canopy design when attempting stall maneuvers. In this case, the 1.3:1 wing loading and slightly tapered canopy design combined to create a fast spin when he let up the toggle. Such a severe twist at this wing loading might necessitate a cutaway, for which he didn't have sufficient altitude.

As low as he was when he instigated this problem, his only viable option may have been to deploy the reserve canopy without a cutaway. The reserve then may have had sufficient time to inflate, stop the spin, slow the descent and possibly even give the jumper time to cut away the main after the reserve opened.

Inducing a line twist from over-controlling the canopy should be avoided at any altitude. Through training and guidance from experienced canopy pilots, a jumper can more safely study the limits of his parachute and learn to handle it safely across its entire control range.

A fatal main lift web failure occurred on the same make and model of student harness and container system 12 months prior to this accident, although at a different point on the assembly. The FAA is leading an investigation to determine a course of action. The manufacturer has issued a service bulletin calling for a thorough inspection by a master rigger before the next jump on the gear. Owners of any system using adjustable main lift webs should be alert to wear or damage.

Although USPA recommends RSLs, this jumper did not use one.

An RSL could have favorably influenced the outcome of this incident. Experience has shown that trying to retrieve another jumper's cutaway canopy, freebag or other items is not a sound idea, regardless of skill level. Attempting it with a high-performance canopy, such as this highly experienced swoop competitor was using, makes the results even less predictable and potentially hazardous.

He received immediate medical attention and was airlifted to a local hospital. He died several hours later from his head injuries.

Jumpers should repeatedly practice canopy maneuvers at a higher altitude before attempting to use a speed-building maneuver for landing. Any jumper can benefit from structured canopy training with a knowledgeable canopy pilot as a coach, and those who are looking to make performance landings should especially seek out this type of training.

Jumpers should downsize to smaller canopies only after becoming thoroughly familiar with larger canopies flown at lighter wing loadings. All jumpers must flare the parachute at an altitude sufficient to allow the canopy to generate lift for the landing.

The tandem pair exited the aircraft and a clean drogue deployment is seen on the recovered video. The remainder of the video was severely damaged and no other information was recoverable from the tape. At some point the drogue release handle was pulled. The main parachute deployment resulted in a bag-lock malfunction with one outerline stow still intact with its stow band holding it to the deployment bag. The reserve handle was pulled before Cypres firing altitude and the 3ring risers had released. The reserve static line was still connected in its normal position on the right shoulder and wsa still connected to the main riser. Evidence indicates that the cutaway handle was pulled after reserve deployment ; the 3ring release had been activated. The reserve deployed into the trailing malfunction and the reserve suspension lines above and below the reserve deployment bag. The right riser was close to its normal position on the shoulder area. The left main riser was heavily involved in the main reserve entaglement. At some point the main canopy came out of its deployment bag however the single outer line stow never released and there were too many line twists for the main to deploy.

Skydiver's Information Manual Sections 6-10 and 6-11 provide guidance and recommendations for advanced canopy training, as well as canopy choice and downsizing recommendations. Canopies at this size and wing loading exceed the scope of the SIM and require specialized information and expertise to fly safely, available only through qualified canopy coaches. Jumpers who wish to make high-performance landings should engage an experienced canopy pilot as a coach and follow a structured training program to reduce the risks of this very demanding discipline. The SIM also recommends that jumpers who have downsized to this level without performing such advanced maneuvers learn them on a larger canopy first.

This jumper was wearing a camera helmet; however, the force of her landing resulted in severe head and neck injuries beyond the helmet's ability to protect her.

One jumper remained in freefall and struck the other jumper that was under canopy.

His body was found with the reserve bridle and pilot chute wrapped around his legs, indicating that he was tumbling during deployment. He was found also with the lines of the reserve wrapped around his neck, but the autopsy revealed no neck injuries or broken bones of any type. The coroner concluded that the jumper died of a torn aorta. It is unknown when the damage to his heart occurred: during the collision, on opening or upon landing.

The collision may have rendered him unable to gain control in freefall. How high he deployed his reserve is unknown, but it appears to be above 750 feet, the AAD activation altitude.

Neither jumper held a USPA A license, as required by the USPA Basic Safety Requirements for group jumps without being accompanied by at least a USPA Coach under the supervision of a USPA Instructor (Skydiver's Information Manual Section 2-1.E.6.b). Neither was a USPA member, and the jump took place at a non-Group Member drop zone.

According to the incident report, the logbook of the deceased jumper showed that he had performed three static-line jumps and two tandem jumps during his initial training, but the report did not provide information about the subsequent training of either jumper or the plan for the jump.

When training in the USPA Integrated Student Program, students learn from a USPA Coach or Instructor how to plan and prepare for group jumps, including choosing an effective breakoff altitude and tracking training and evaluation. To qualify for the A license, each applicant must demonstrate adequate group jumping skills during a check dive with a USPA Instructor.

Following group freefall activities, jumpers must gain enough separation in freefall for safe deployments. SIM Section 6-1.C.3 recommends that jumpers precede deployment with a distinct wave-off while looking around to ensure that the area is clear.

Investigators found both the cutaway and reserve ripcord handles extracted and close to the body. The reserve canopy had apparently cleared its freebag but had not begun to inflate.

Toxicology reports showed that the deceased jumper had a blood-alcohol level of .16 percent, twice the .08 legal limit to operate a motor vehicle in most states. The coroner also found cannabinoids (marijuana) but did not specify when the jumper may have last ingested them.

Use of any intoxicant affects awareness, judgment and motor skills. When combined, their effects become unpredictable. Federal Aviation Regulation 105.7—and, therefore, SIM Section 2-1.B.1 (BSRs)—prohibits jumping under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

The jumper who was killed wore a visual altimeter but was not equipped with an AAD or an audible altimeter. Section 6-2 of the Skydiver's Information Manual recommends the use of a visual altimeter, an AAD and at least one audible altimeter, preferably two, when freeflying. The use of an automatic activation device may have favorably changed the outcome of this incident.

Regardless of the personal equipment a jumper carries, it remains the responsibility of every jumper to know his altitude and to deploy a parachute. Every skydiver must deploy in time for a safe landing in a clear area, and the Basic Safety Requirements require that even the most experienced jumpers deploy by 2,000 feet AGL.

The plan was to release the foot hold at approximately 100 feet, separating them in time for landing. Witnesses reported that while the canopies were in the last side-by-side formation, it appeared that one of the jumpers was struggling to free his foot from the harness strap when the canopies turned outward into the fatal downplane.

Using any piece of equipment on a skydive requires careful forethought, rigging and practice on the ground to discover any failure mode. The report did not indicate what problems the jumpers may have encountered when they tried to disengage from the device, however.

Landing canopy formations or even taking them down to a low altitude before separating is a risky business that leaves little room for error. The results can be fatal, as in this case. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 6-6.E.7.d recommends, "Breakoff for landing should take place no lower than 2,500 feet because of the danger of entanglement at breakoff time."

The plan was to release the foot hold at approximately 100 feet, separating them in time for landing. Witnesses reported that while the canopies were in the last side-by-side formation, it appeared that one of the jumpers was struggling to free his foot from the harness strap when the canopies turned outward into the fatal downplane.

Using any piece of equipment on a skydive requires careful forethought, rigging and practice on the ground to discover any failure mode. The report did not indicate what problems the jumpers may have encountered when they tried to disengage from the device, however.

Landing canopy formations or even taking them down to a low altitude before separating is a risky business that leaves little room for error. The results can be fatal, as in this case. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 6-6.E.7.d recommends, "Breakoff for landing should take place no lower than 2,500 feet because of the danger of entanglement at breakoff time."

The deceased jumper was found with his main pilot chute out of the BOC pouch, but it was apparently dislodged on impact. The cutaway handle and reserve ripcord were both in place.

No definitive reason has been discovered for this fatality. Ultimately, all jumpers must deploy a parachute with enough altitude to allow for a safe landing.

The airplane flipped over and spun out of control. The pilot and remaining jumpers were able to exit the airplane and deploy their parachutes at a safe altitude, but the pilot suffered neck injuries while working to get out of the airplane. The entangled jumper was found dead at the crash site in a bean field below, still attached to the tail by his main canopy. He had been killed from a blunt blow to the head, which possibly occurred as he was pulled around the landing gear.

Jumpers should make sure their equipment is ready for the skydive well before they get to the door of the airplane and guard against problems while inside, including dislodged straps, handles and closing pins. Sections 4 and 5 of the Skydiver's Information Manual include a great deal of useful information on equipment checks and maintenance that should be familiar to every licensed skydiver. A final pin check before exit helps ensure that the main and reserve containers are properly closed and ready for use.

This stunt had been tried successfully only a few times by several other jumpers prior to the fatal jump. Although the deceased jumper was highly experienced, his wing loading under the experimental canopy is estimated at 8.6:1, well beyond the experience of skydiving.

Research with G-force (the unit of force equal to Earth's gravity) induced loss-of-consciousness experiments shows that a human exposed to the rapid onset of nine Gs-and sometimes less-will typically lose consciousness after approximately six seconds. The force generated from the rapid spin may have made it too difficult for the jumper to raise his arms enough to reach the release handle before he lost consciousness. It's also possible that wearing two harnesses may have obstructed access to the release handle. The force generated by the spin may also have made it too difficult for the jumper to pull the release handle.

Experimenting with new techniques and equipment requires careful design and testing of the system under a variety of circumstances to reduce risk. An unmanned drop test with the experimental canopy may have revealed that opening in this configuration could exceed human limits to respond. It is not known whether the harness and release system were tested sufficiently under such a heavy load or for being worn with a standard approved parachute system.