His canopy was observed to be over the PLA from approximately 500ft. He was then seen to make a radical turn at a low altitude, of approximately 270°s impacting with the ground whilst still in the turn.

He had successfully made a number of ‘swoop’ type landings previously. The Board believe that on this occasion he had miscalculated the minimum height needed to complete the turn in order to successfully achieve the ’swoop’ landing. This resulted in him striking the ground at high speed.

It is not known whether he had received any formal coaching for ‘swoop’ type landings.

The Recommendation of the Board is that parachutists should be reminded of the possible consequences of radical turns close to the ground.

The aircraft climbed to approximately 12,000ft AGL and a ‘jump run’ was made over the PLA. Once the aircraft was at the estimated exit point, the parachutists began to exit the aircraft. Two groups of two parachutists exited first, followed by two solo parachutists. The deceased, who was videoing a Tandem pair then exited with them. The free fall part of the descent went without incident. He was observed under canopy and his parachute appeared to be flying normally. At a low altitude his parachute was observed to make some radical spiral turns and impacted with the ground before the parachute regained level flight.

a) That whilst turning the parachute low to the ground, and because of the configuration of the lights attached to his helmet, a control line may have fouled one of the lights on his helmet, thereby making it difficult to get the parachute into level flight again. However, when inspecting the equipment the Board could find no evidence to support this and feel that this possibility is unlikely.

b) That he elected to make some radical turns and misjudged his altitude making the turns too low to the ground and was unable to get his parachute back into level flight to make a safe landing.

c) That he switched off his video camera once his parachute had deployed and was paying attention to turning the camera back on while still in a radical turn, low to the ground. He may have been hindered by the configuration of the lights attached to his helmet and have been unaware of his close proximity to the ground, thereby misjudging his height and have been unable to get his parachute under control and to level out in order to land safely.

After viewing his videotape many times, the Board believes that the camera was switched on only 2 to 3 seconds before he struck the ground.

The Board is of the opinion, having viewed previous descents made by him, that sometimes his practice was to switch off his camera once his parachute had deployed and then switch it back on at a lower altitude before landing.

The Board concludes that c), above is the most likely possibility.

At approximately 150-300ft AGL he was observed to detach from the main parachute and then fall away from it. It was then observed that the reserve parachute started to deploy, but he was then lost from view, just prior to impact.

At an altitude of approximately 3,500ft AGL the jumpmaster dispatched the deceased, who exited in a reasonable position.

As the main parachute deployed it developed fully but had a number of twists in the rigging lines. He was observed to attempt to ‘kick’ the twists out, as he had been taught. However, he may have depressed a steering toggle before the twists were fully out, not in accordance with the training he had received, resulting in the parachute turning to the left. This may have made it more difficult for the remaining twists to clear.

During this period of time the DZ Controller gave instructions over the ‘ground to parachutist’ radio for him to ‘pull his risers apart’ to assist in the clearance of the twists. It is not known as to whether he heard or carried out these instructions.

Eventually, at approximately 150-300ft AGL, he carried out his emergency drills, but because of the low altitude the reserve parachute did not deploy before impact.