The other report follows: The wrappee was on straight final from over the taxiway (landing toward the east-northeast.) The wrapper (fatality) flew into him from the south consistent with a right hand 90 degree approach pattern. Other people on the load indicated that they had a good spot and were all coming from the runway side of the DZ. The wrap lasted a very short time and the low guy came out with a full canopy with line twist, in very deep brakes. The canopy never gained any airspeed and it fully stalled. When he hit the tarmac just south of the fuel pumps, he hit flat on his back. A pulse or airway was never restored. He was 200 lbs and was flying a Spectre 190, implying a loading of around 1.1 lb/ft^2.

On about the team's 30th jump, one of the jumpers opened with twisted lines, and this jumper's canopy opened off heading, lfying rapidly toward the jumper with line twists. He apparently collided chest first into the other's reserve container. Both were seriously injured , and this jumper landed apparently unconcious in straight and level flight with his brakes still stowed. Shortly after arriving at the hospital, he died from a reptured aorta, evidently sustained during the mid-air collision. The other jumper is expected to recover from his injuries.

Although one jumper may have a line twist, the other jumpers in a group are usually flying away. In this case, the line twist from one jumper combined with the off-heading opening of the other, casuing the two to close at a high speed before either could react to avoid a collision.

Jumpers need to gain sufficient separation after each jump to open in clear airspace and remain clear after opening, regardless of their experience or familiarity with the type of jumper and the other jumpers on the load. Jumpers must also consider their equipment requirement into their planned breakoff altitudes, allowing sufficient altitude for everyone to track clear.

It is important that every skydive include a plan for breakoff and canopy descent, regardless of the number of people in the group. Each jumper needs adequate clearance from other jumpers during deployment to allow for an off-heading opening or other problem. This becomes more important with faster-flying canopies.

1. The jumper had a current lisence.
2. There was no alcohol, drugs or narcotics found in jumper's blood. The cause of death was a ruptured chest aorta.
3. The jumper had total experience of 248 jumps and was a current jumper.
4. The equipment the jumper was using, was in good condition and did not contribute to the accident.
5. There was a quite big error in the altimeter, and it was showing lower altitude than it should have.
6. The jumper had not enough experience to use the canopy. In Finland 250 jumps is required to jump any elliptical high performance canopy. The canopy flying history of the jumper was:
Sabre 150: 110 jumps, Springo 120: 24 jumps.
7. The exit weight was not more than the manufacturer has stated to be the maximum exit weight, but the wing load was more than it is recommended by the SIL for jumpers with less than 250 jumps (1,1 lbs/sqft)
8. The jump was her first 8-way jump, and first from two planes. The jumper had enough experience for the freefall part of the jump.
9. The jump was not planned with enough care (breakoff altitude, spotting) and there was also jumpers with too low experience for the jump.
10. Because of the wind direction, the windsock was downwind of the landing area. There was no windsock in the landing area.
11. The wind was turbulent and gusty. Also rising and downgoing thermals were reported by jumpers.
12. The jumper had encountered problems landing with her canopy in turbulent wind conditions.
13. The jumper did 180 degrees landing pattern turn to final and collided with another jumpers canopy, the other jumper was flying the downwind part of the landing pattern. The collision was between the accident jumper and the side nose part or the top skin of the other jumper's canopy. The collision took place at altitude of approximately 50 meters (160ft).
14. The experience level of the jumper was not high enough to have automation level of handling to fly the canopy after the collision that happened suddenly at low altitude.

Main reason: lack of airspace awarenes that lead to the collision. However there may have been a number of contributional factors leading to this:

1. It was new type of jump to the jumper.
2. There was more jumpers on the jump than she had used to.
3. Opening altitude lower than it was planned to be.
4. Turbulent air conditions, and the previous bad experiences the jumper had in flying and landing in turbulent conditions.
5. Too low experience for the high performance canopy
6. Possible misjudging the altitude under canopy.
7. Misjudging the altitude because an error in altimeter's reading
8. The jumper tried to fly to the normal landing area regardles of the low altitude or
9. The presence of a photographer in the ground.

* The canopy collision could happen because both jumpers did not look out good enough in the last part of their landing pattern.
* It can not be ruled out jumper 2 was low in his left hand landing pattern, causing him to end up in jumper 1's pattern in opposite direction.
* Jumper 2 was killed by the tree strike. Had he landed on the ground the outcome need not have been fatal.

Recommendations:

* Continuously look around during canopy flight and stay alert at all times. Always be aware of position and flying direction of other canopy pilots. Evade oncoming traffic to the right.
* Start your left hand landing pattern at the correct altitude, neither too high (so as not to hinder other jumpers) nor too low (to prevent low turns).
* Choose an empty space on the DZ. Not everyone has to land on the target.

The student sunk to the ground pretty much straight vertically at a signifficantly increased rate, while the other jumper orbited on a wider radius. Thanks to this the student was able to PLF, which is why he suffers relatively light injuries. The rotating jumper hit the ground flat suffering severe internal injuries. Paramedics arrived at the scene 8 minutes later, two helicopters shortly after. The jumper died when lifelifted to Würzburg univerity hospital. The student is recovering.

Although USPA recommends RSLs, this jumper did not use one.

An RSL could have favorably influenced the outcome of this incident. Experience has shown that trying to retrieve another jumper's cutaway canopy, freebag or other items is not a sound idea, regardless of skill level. Attempting it with a high-performance canopy, such as this highly experienced swoop competitor was using, makes the results even less predictable and potentially hazardous.

One jumper remained in freefall and struck the other jumper that was under canopy.

His body was found with the reserve bridle and pilot chute wrapped around his legs, indicating that he was tumbling during deployment. He was found also with the lines of the reserve wrapped around his neck, but the autopsy revealed no neck injuries or broken bones of any type. The coroner concluded that the jumper died of a torn aorta. It is unknown when the damage to his heart occurred: during the collision, on opening or upon landing.

The collision may have rendered him unable to gain control in freefall. How high he deployed his reserve is unknown, but it appears to be above 750 feet, the AAD activation altitude.

Neither jumper held a USPA A license, as required by the USPA Basic Safety Requirements for group jumps without being accompanied by at least a USPA Coach under the supervision of a USPA Instructor (Skydiver's Information Manual Section 2-1.E.6.b). Neither was a USPA member, and the jump took place at a non-Group Member drop zone.

According to the incident report, the logbook of the deceased jumper showed that he had performed three static-line jumps and two tandem jumps during his initial training, but the report did not provide information about the subsequent training of either jumper or the plan for the jump.

When training in the USPA Integrated Student Program, students learn from a USPA Coach or Instructor how to plan and prepare for group jumps, including choosing an effective breakoff altitude and tracking training and evaluation. To qualify for the A license, each applicant must demonstrate adequate group jumping skills during a check dive with a USPA Instructor.

Following group freefall activities, jumpers must gain enough separation in freefall for safe deployments. SIM Section 6-1.C.3 recommends that jumpers precede deployment with a distinct wave-off while looking around to ensure that the area is clear.