There were no indications of freefall stability problems in any of this jumper’s previous training skydives. He had successfully met the required tasks on each jump and had also accumulated 40 to 45 minutes of training in a wind tunnel. He may have panicked after realizing he had grabbed his jumpsuit gripper instead of his main pilot chute handle. When he reached across his body toward his right hip with his left arm, it caused him to flip on his back and tumble away from the instructor. The student then appeared to attempt to roll over face to earth, but his de-arched body position kept him in a back-to-earth position.

Skydiver’s Information Manual Section 5-1 recommends that jumpers deploy at an appropriate altitude (no lower than 3,000 feet AGL for students) in a stable, face-to-earth body position; however, a jumper’s priority is to pull at the correct altitude, regardless of body position. SIM Section 4 recommends that students who do not find their main deployment handle on their first try make no more than two additional attempts to locate the handle. If a student still cannot deploy his main, he should immediately pull his reserve ripcord. Although deploying in a face-to-earth position is ideal, it’s more important to deploy at the assigned altitude, regardless of body position. In most cases, a main canopy deployment while a jumper is back to earth has resulted in a successful opening without any malfunction or entanglement.

The automatic activation device did activate this jumper’s reserve at some point, but it’s unknown at what altitude. Investigators found the student with his reserve pilot chute trapped under his arm, with approximately eight feet of reserve bridle out of the container and wrapped around his torso and right arm. This indicates that the reserve deployed while the jumper was spinning on his back, which caused his arm to trap the reserve pilot chute and bridle instead of the pilot chute finding clean air to deploy the reserve.

Just as deploying a main while back to earth almost always results in a normal deployment, the same is true for reserve canopies; entanglements such as this between the jumper and the deploying reserve canopy or its pilot chute or freebag are rare, even if the reserve is deployed in a less-than-desirable body position. Had the reserve pilot chute not been trapped by the jumper’s arm, the result would likely have been a fully deployed reserve parachute.

The instructor attempted to dock with the student once he saw him experiencing a problem with his deployment but was unable to dock and assist before the student rolled over and tumbled away. AFF instructors are trained and evaluated in assisting with student deployments, and it’s a good idea for AFF instructors to stay no more than an arm’s length from each student whenever possible, even when students are performing well during a skydive. All instructors are trained to deploy their own main canopy no lower than 2,000 feet, regardless of whether the student has deployed. The report indicated that this instructor initiated his main canopy deployment at 1,500 feet. By the time his main canopy inflated and began to slow his descent, his AAD had activated his reserve canopy. Even though both canopies inflated properly and he landed without incident, the low deployment placed him at additional risk of a main-reserve entanglement.

It is unclear why this jumper flew the downwind leg of her canopy pattern to such a low altitude of 100 feet before trying to face into the wind for landing. There were no reports of canopy traffic or obstacles in the area. The jumper most likely did realize that she was at a low altitude since she initiated a braked turn, apparently in an effort to conserve altitude and face into the wind for landing. Winds were reported between five and 10 mph at the time of her landing.

Investigators reported that the jumper may have performed the braked turn with too much toggle input (brakes pulled too deeply) causing the canopy to stall as it turned before surging forward with a rapid descent rate. Even though the jumper had tried to salvage the landing by flaring hard with both toggles, there was not enough altitude for the canopy to slow its rapid descent before she struck the ground.

Other witnesses reported that the canopy had completed the braked turn without stalling and that the jumper let the canopy toggles all the way up to full flight at approximately 30 to 40 feet above the ground, which caused the canopy to surge forward at a low altitude. They added that the canopy was still in a steep descent when she fully flared the canopy at five to 10 feet, and then she struck the ground hard before the canopy could level off from the landing flare.

Regardless of whether the canopy was stalled from a deep-braked turn at approximately 30 feet or was returned to full flight from a deep-braked position, the result was essentially the same: As the canopy surged forward out of its slow flight, it accelerated forward and went into a dive, which caused the jumper to pendulum behind the canopy. This increased the angle of attack of the canopy, further accelerating it toward the ground. She flared the canopy in an attempt to level off the wing, but there was not enough altitude for the flare to be effective.

This jumper was using a 120-square-foot main canopy at a wing loading of almost 1.6:1, which is recommended for jumpers classified as expert by the canopy manufacturer. The report did not indicate how long this jumper had been using this canopy, but with only 350 jumps total under her belt, she would have had to rapidly downsize to jump such a small canopy so early in her skydiving career. Most industry experts agree that 350 jumps does not classify a jumper as an expert.

Braked turns work well to conserve altitude; however, jumpers should receive coaching for the different methods used to perform braked turns and practice this type of turn often at higher altitudes above the landing pattern to become familiar with the maneuver. Moving to full flight from a braked approach should also be practiced at higher altitudes to learn how much altitude each canopy requires to recover to straight and level flight. Practice up high will help each jumper become familiar with the toggle inputs that work best for the wing loading and canopy used for the maneuvers. Jumpers should practice these maneuvers again with each new canopy to become familiar with the canopy’s performance characteristics while flying in a variety of brake settings.

The landing area was large and provided plenty of space to fly a landing pattern that would have allowed for this jumper’s base leg and final approach turns at higher altitudes even if it meant landing away from the intended landing spot. In the landing pattern, a turn to final approach at 300 to 500 feet allows for enough altitude to make slight corrections on final to avoid obstacles and still keep the wing level and into the wind for landing, without the added challenges of flying a braked turn just before landing.

There were a total of four tandem pairs in the air on the load; two of them, including this one, were relatively close together on final approach. Jumpers on the ground waited as each pair landed to catch the tandem canopies (i.e. to collapse the parachutes). This tandem pair was at approximately 200 feet above the ground and had passed over top of the catchers when investigators believe the instructor decided to make a 360-degree turn to shorten his final approach and land closer to the waiting catchers. However, once he was halfway through the turn, the altitude lost during the turn placed him and his student at the same level as a second tandem pair who had been behind and below them and were facing into the wind.

The two tandems were now facing each other. The second tandem instructor stated that the first tandem pair passed by in a downwind direction and that the first instructor was looking directly at him as he went by. As soon as the first tandem passed the second tandem pair, this tandem instructor initiated a hard 180-degree turn, most likely to try to face into the wind for landing. However, by the time he had passed the facing traffic of the second tandem pair, he had descended to approximately 50 feet, which was much too low to complete a 180-degree turn. This tandem and their canopy struck the ground at nearly the same time, with the canopy still in a steep diving turn.

As with many fatalities, several factors combined to lead to a fatal outcome. Take away any one of the factors, and the outcome may have changed.

This was the fourth load of the day at the DZ. Earlier in the day, winds had been above 22 mph, which the drop zone uses as a cutoff point for all jump operations. The pilot and DZ staff monitored the wind as the day progressed, and jumping started once the wind had been below 20 mph for 20 minutes. On each jump, following standard procedures for the drop zone, the pilot checked the wind speed with ground operations in case the winds had picked up after takeoff and increased beyond the 22-mph limit. During this jump run, the wind meter on the ground indicated 15 mph, and the weather reporting station indicated eight knots around the time of the skydive, with a gust to 20 knots at some point in a 10-minute range.

Once this tandem instructor initially realized he was going to land well beyond the waiting catchers on the ground, a better option may have been to remain facing into the wind and land with the canopy flying straight and level rather than making aggressive turns close to the ground to land closer to his intended target. Even if the tandem catchers would not have been able to reach the pair as they landed, the instructor could have disconnected the reserve static line and pulled the cutaway handle after landing to release the main canopy and avoid being dragged by the main in the strong winds.

Even after the instructor had decided to make the subsequent attempt at a 360-degree turn, only to pause for traffic halfway through the turn, a better decision may have been to keep the canopy flying straight and level and land in a downwind direction—or possibly turn slightly and land somewhat crosswind—rather than initiate another drastic turn so close to the ground. While landing downwind isn’t ideal in 15-plus mph winds, the pair would have had the chance to land with little downward speed and most likely been able to slide in the landing, which would provide less chance of an injury than landing in a turn at a high rate of descent.

Jumping in strong and/or gusty winds has led to many injuries and several fatal landings in the past. Experienced jumpers, solo students, and tandem instructors and their students have all suffered fatal accidents on jumps that took place in conditions where strong winds, gusty winds or a combination of both played a factor in the outcome. Tandem instructors often jump in winds of 15 to 20 mph without incident, especially if the winds are steady and remain smooth throughout the canopy descent and landing. Still, all tandem instructors need to carefully consider the weather conditions along with the many other factors that must be taken into account while jumping in tandem with students.

While the majority of skydivers manage to land uneventfully when jumping in strong or erratic winds, every jumper, including tandem instructors, needs to consider the additional risks that come with skydiving in these conditions.

This jumper was taking part in a large formation skydive with approximately 60 other skydivers. Large formations often require each jumper to fly in heavy canopy traffic in an orderly pattern for landing. On his final approach, this jumper's canopy apparently hit the wake turbulence of the canopy in front of him and immediately collapsed.

Jumpers need to be aware of turbulence hazards to parachutes, which can come from many different sources. Each canopy creates a wake vortex capable of collapsing any parachute behind it; the turbulent air is found directly behind and above the canopy as it flies through the air. Additionally, wind passing over obstacles such as trees and buildings is disrupted, causing turbulence that can be found on and near the ground directly downwind of the obstructions. Skydiver's Information Manual Section 4 explains the effects of turbulence on canopies in Category C of the Integrated Student Program and cautions jumpers to anticipate turbulence 10 to 20 times the height of an obstacle on the downwind side. If possible, this jumper should have avoided the wake turbulence of the canopy in front of him by flying to the side of the canopy, rather than directly behind it.