24 Matches (out of a total of 833 incidents)
  1. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    05/01/2003 Creswell, OR MED? 57 ?/?   #336265
    Description: After an uneventful 11-way the jumper hit a fence upon landing under a Cypres deployed reserve
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  2. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    06/04/2003 Skydive in Paradise, CA NOP,MAL 52 253 Y/Y   #441183
    Description: A 52-year old skydiver with 253 jumps died after deploying neither the main nor emergency chutes. His Cypress fired the reserve while he was spinning on his back. He had videoed a 2way on the jump. Both other jumpers opened at about 3,000-2500 feet agl and landed fine on the DZ. The jumper was found dead about 1/2 mile north of the DZ in a wooded area. An observer at the DZ had seen the reserve parachute open at tree top level.
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    USPA Description: This jumper was videoing a 2-way skydive that was uneventful until deployment. Apparently trying to open his main parachute at approximately 3,000 feet, he flipped onto his back and began to spin. He continued to spin on his back until his automatic activation device initiated deployment of his reserve parachute. However, the reserve did not fully inflate before he reached the ground.
    USPA Conclusions:This jumper was making his fourth jump using a new full-wing camera suit. His total number of jumps using video equipment was not reported. The wings of the jumpsuit may have made it difficult to find the deployment handle, located at the bottom of his main container. Hje apparently lost control whil attempting deployment and may have lost altitude awareness while spinning on his back. For whatever reason, he did not deploy a parachute in time.
    Full-wing camera suits can present stability problems such as this jumper experienced during deployment. Faced with this kind of situation, the jumper should maintain stability if possible, make no more than two attempts to locate the main deployment handle and then resort to the reserve parachute. If the main deployment handle can't be located after two additional attempts or, for those with B, C, or D licenses, by 1,800 feet, deploying the reserve - even if unstable - would be a better option.
    Jumpers using this type of suit should become thoroughly familiar with the suit and deployment prcoedures before jumping with a camera. The AAD initiated reserve deployment, and the reserve began to inflate without an entanglement, but the actual AAD activation altitude is unknown. One witness reported that the reserve appeared to hesitate between activation and deployment, possibly as a result of the jumper's back-to-earth orientation. The AAD is set to fire only a few seconds from the ground, and this reported hesitaiton could have made the difference in this case.
  3. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    20/04/2003 Skydive Arizona, AZ MAL 27 250 Y/N 1 #452847
    Description: The jumper had made 4 jumps the previous weekend, 45 in the past 6 months, 142 in the last year all on equipment in use on her last jump. It was her first jump of the day. She was reported to be alert and in good spirits, as usual. The skydive proceeded normally until she was between 200 to 300 feet above the ground. At that point she initiated a full toggle turn and held it until she struck the ground. She was between the second and third 360 when she struck. Medics among the jumpers responded in seconds, Eloy Fire arrived shortly after, and a med-vac helicopter was on the scene within 15 minutes after the accident. She was declared dead at the scence shortly after the arrival of the helicopter. Over a dozen experienced jumpers observed the accident and all agree on what they saw. Her flight appeared to be normal until the low turn. There were no reports of traffic in her immediate area, although in the light and variable conditions at the time, there may have been some uncertainty about the direction to land. However, she was among the last on the load to land and the direction was already well established. The canopy was loaded at 1.03 and did not appear to have any type of malfunction. The AAD was on, and everything appeared to be in good condition. She did not have the reputation for any sort of unsafe or unwise skydiving behavior. She has registered for the drop zone's Easter Boogie this morning and all of her paper work was in order. There were no reported medical problems, medications, or allergies. She did wear glasses or contacts but it is unclear as to whether she was wearing them at the time of the accident. Skies were clear and temperatures were in the mid seventies.
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    USPA Description: After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, this jumper initiated a turn at approximately 200 to 300 feet AGL. The turn continued for several revolutions before she struck the ground while in a steep, diving spiral. The jumper died from the injuries sustained in the hard landing.
    USPA Conclusions:Witnessed reported that there was no apparent reason for a turning maneuver, such as avoiding another skydiver, trying to face into the wind or avoiding an obstacle on the ground. An inspection of the gear found all of the components to be in good condition.
    The FAA designated parachute rigger examiner who inspected the equipment found that the steering lines on this equipment could feasibly be trapped when under a load and held in a turning position. He was able to replicate having the stering-line brake loop jam between the slider grommet and deployment brake system on the rear riser. In this scenario, the jumper could make a turn and then find the sterring line locked in a turning position.
    It is possible that if the steering line had stuck in the turning position at a low altitude, it would not have provided enough time for the jumper to assess what had happened and react before reaching the ground. In this case, at such a low altitude,t he only response that may have allowed for a survivable landing would have been to pull the other steering line to an equal position, which would neutralize the turn and allow for a braked landing. The investigator cautions jumpers to consider the position of the slider on the risers after opening.
    Some slider and riser designs allow the jumper to pull the slider past the brake system and store it at the base of the risers and out of the way of the brake system. This system typcially uses type-17 mini-risers and large slider grommets. Others are designed so the slider stops above the brake system and cannot be pulled down. On this type of system, the slider grommets can't get past the wider type-8 risers, larger steel connector links with bumpers or optional soft-link slider stops.
    Jumpers should use either system as designed. If the jumper chooses to leave the slider at the top of type-17, one-inch-wide mini-risers, it is possible for the slider to slip down over the brake system at any time during the canopy descent and interfere with the movement of a steering line through the toggle keeper ring. Either slider stops should be installed to keep the slider at the top of the risers, or upon full canopy inflation, the slider should be pulled down below the steering toggles to the bottom of the risers.
  4. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    26/04/2003 Monroe, GA LOWT 62 1673 Y/?   #461553
    Description: This experienced jumper was on the first load in "tricky" winds with an off DZ spot. He was seen initiating a hard toggle turn at approximately 100 feet to avoid an unknown obstacle.
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    USPA Description: After an uneventful 10-way group freefall skydive and routine deployment, this jumper was faced with an off-field landing. At an altitude estimated between 60 and 80 feet, he made a hard 180-degree right turn and struck the ground at the same time as the canopy. The jumper broke his neck upon landing.
    USPA Conclusions:Three other jumpers in the same group landed safely in a nearby field. Witnesses observed this jumper turning left and right at apporximately 200 feet as if trying to decide where to land. It is not clear whether the jumper was trying to steer in the wind or avoid obstacles, but for whatever reason, he made an aggressive turn too low for the canopy to recover before landing. Neither the jumper's canopy size nor wing loading was reported.
    Faced with a bad spot, jumpers should plan high enough to fly a safe landing approach into a clear area. Turns must be completed in time for the canopy to recover to straight and level flight for the landing flare.
  5. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    04/05/2003 Great Lakes Skydiving, MI FFCOL 32 800 Y/Y   #470128
    Description: The jumper was part of a larger freefly group and collided during break-off rendering them both unconcious. The AADs of both jumpers deployed their reserves. One jumper was able to walk away but the other passed away next morning in the hospital.
    Lessons:The higher freefall speeds of freeflying increases the risks of incidents especially during break-off. Be careful
    Description: This jumper was part of a 3-way head-down skydive in which he planned to orbit around the other two skydivers. Witnesses reported that this jumper and one of the other jumpers appeared to come very close together at breakoff altitude, and apparently, they collided. The two jumpers began to separate from each other in freefall and continued falling until their reserve parachutes opened at a low altitude. This jumper was observed to be limp in the harness during the canopy descent and struck a tree and then a car trunk before reaching the ground. First aid was administered immediately, and he was airlifted to a hospital, but he died the next day.
    Conclusions:The collision apparently occurred just as the two center jumpers initiated breakoff from each other to track away before deployment. Witnesses reported that the formation was difficult to observe from the ground due to its horizontal distance from the DZ. The training or freefly experience of the three jumpers was not reported.
    Both jumpers' automatic activation devices had fired. The other jumper also suffered head injuries and was found wandering in a confused state near the DZ. He was unable to recall the jump. Bother jumpers wore hard helmets, although the collision apparently knocked the helmet off the jumper who was killed. His helmet was receovered later during a search of the area, but its condition was not reported. The surviving jumper's helmet was described as cracked, leaving sharp edges that cut his head.
    Any group skydive should include a breakoff plan to ensure that each jumper safely separates to clear airspace for deployment. As freeflying becomes more common, USPA hears of more and more freefall collisions. Most have been uneventful, but some have resulted in injuries or fatalities.
    Jumpers should gain control and awareness in freeflying orientations with an experienced freefly coach before jumping with others. Further USPA recommendations on freeflying appear in Section 6-2 of the Skydiver's Information Manual
  6. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    11/05/2003 Zephyrhills, FL LAND 52 601 Y/N   #478818
    Description: The jumper was observed at approximately 400 feet under a fully functioning canopy. When next observed at approximately 200-300 the jumper appeared to have twists in his canopy. Winds were approximately 15-20 knots and the jumper was in a turbulent area over large trees and downwind of a hangar. It is not know if the turbulence and/or control inputs induced the twists. The jumper was unable to clear the twists before landing and hit at high speed. Despite swift medical assistance, the jumper died of his injuries.
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    USPA Description: After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, witnesses observed this jumper with line twists and spinning under the canopy from approximately 250 feet until he struck the ground.
    USPA Conclusions:Several people observed this jumper at the beginning of his canopy descent flying his parachute without any problems. One witness reported seeing this jumper inititiate a hard toggle turn that may have created the line twists. However, nobody saw the canopy and jumper at the very instant that the line twists actually occurred.
    Because the line twists appeared at 250 feet above the ground, it is suspected that the jumper initiated a hard, fast toggle turn, resulting in the line twists. Winds were reported to be ten to seventeen mph, and the jumper was in an area where turbulence may have been a factor. The jumper had insufficient altitude to safely initiate a cutaway and was apparently unable to recover from the line twists.
    USPA receives reports of this type of jumper-induced malfunction several times a year. Fortunately, most of the jumpers have enough altitude for safe cutaways and reserve deployments. Category G of the Integrated Student Program provides ground training and practical exercises to help students understand the possible dangers of hard toggle turns and the possibility of induced line twists. All jumpers should have a thorough understanding of their parachutes and the limits to the range of control input available for any situation.
    Faced with an unrecoverable situation at an altitude too low for a safe cutaway, a jumper has everything to gain and nothing to lose by deploying the reserve parachute.
  7. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    18/05/2003 Skydive Utah, UT FFCOL,LAND 23 250 Y/N   #489681
    Description: The jumper was diving down to join to complete a seven way formation skydive but was unable to stop before he collided with another jumper hard. Both jumpers had canopies open for landing and seemed to be responsive, but the jumper who collided with the other appeared to lose conciousness at approximately 50 feet and struck the ground hard. He died from his injuries next day in hospital. It is not known if the injuries resulted from the freefall collision or the landing.
    Lessons:High speeds can be achieved when swooping a formation. Jumpers should be prudent and ensure they are able to slow down in time when approaching the formation.
    USPA Description: This jumper exited the airplane last in a 7-way belly-flying group jumping from 12,500 feet. At about 10,000 feet and while still diving, he struck another jumper in the formation. Both jumpers immediately deployed their main parachutes. At approximately 100 feet before landing, this jumper was observed to go limp in his harness. He landed hard while apparently incapacitated and without a landing flare.
    USPA Conclusions:This jumper evidently did not keep and eye on his progress as as he dove toward the formation, or he was unable to slow down before reaching it. In any event, the difference between his freefall speed and that of the formation resulted in a hard collision between him and the other jumper. The jumper who died was not wearing a helmet. He suffered head injuries from the collision itself, according to the medical personnel who responded to the accident.
    However, investigators reported that the landing injuries sustained from the hard, no-flare landing caused this jumper's death. His wing loading was estimated to be 1.4:1, which would provide substantial forward speed in an unflared landing. Either jumping within his limits, wearing a helmet or jumping a larger canopy may have changed the outcome of this accident.
  8. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    06/06/2003 Pepperell, MA LOWT 40 228 Y/N   #511936
    Description: It appears the jumper performed a low-turn trying to return from a long spot.
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    USPA Description: After a long climbout with a group of jumpers exiting a Twin Otter, this jumper and one other jumper decided to land off the drop zone in the same field. The other jumper landed without incident. Witnesses observed this jumper make a radical 270-degree turn at a low altitude, causing him to strike the ground hard while still in a turn. He suffered multiple leg fractures, a shattered pelvis and internal injuries from the hard landing. Although the jumper received immediate medical attention at the scene, he died later that day in a nearby hospital.
    USPA Conclusions:The jumper was apparently trying to avoid a small wire that ran approximately 25 feet above the ground through the middle of the field where he chose to land. With his estimated exit weight at 245 pounds, his wing loading was 1.3:1, higher than the manufacturer recommends for an expert under this canopy.
    Jumpers need to consider the consequences of jumping parachutes at high wing loadings. Canopy control issues may not arise until the jumper is presented with a landing challenge, such as landing off the drop zone or dealing with heavy canopy traffic.
    Jumpers should plan landing patterns into clear, open areas free of obstacles. USPA's Integrated Student Program teaches braked turns and approaches to prepare jumpers for landing in a variety of conditions. A properly performed braked turn results in far less altitude loss than a single-toggle turn, making it a safer option for unplanned heading changes at low altitudes. Jumpers must complete all turns with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.
  9. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    07/06/2003 Skydive Chicago, IL CCOL 48 9000 Y/?   #512817
    DropZone.com Description:
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    USPA Description: Two jumpers collided at approximately 30 to 50 feet while on final approach toward the entry gate of a swoop course. The lower jumper's canopy collapsed, and he struck the ground hard in a prone position. He was transported to a local hospital. While being airlifted to a different hospital for treatment, he died of head injuries sustained from the hard landing.
    USPA Conclusions:The two jumpers invloved in the collision were on the same load of a Twin Otter aircraft but were not jumping with each other. A swoop course had recently been placed in the landing area in preparation for an upcoming competition. The jumper who survived the collision reported that he scanned the airspace before initiating a left turn to approach the swoop course but saw no other canopy in the area. As his canopy begain to level out and he was looking at the entry gate of the swoop course, his feet hit the canopy of the lower jumper, causing that canopy to collapse at an alittude reported at 30 to 50 feet.
    The top jumper lost sight of the ground for a few seconds due to the other canopy's obstructing his view. He then saw the ground was very close and flared his canopy just as his feet and knees hit the ground, resulting in anjle, leg and knee injuries.
    Reports conflict regarding the approach direction used by the jumper who was killed. His own canopy may have blocked his view of the higher jumper from either a right or left approach. He also may have been concentrating on his own entry into the swoop course.
    The speeds obtainable under highly wing-loaded canopies allow jumpers to cover large distances in just a few seconds. It is crucial that every jumper maintain and confirm clear airspace, especially with high-performance approaches, to prevent this type of accident.
    At drop zones with courses for canopy swooping, jumpers need to establish and adhere to clear policies to ensure that only qualified canopy pilots attempt to use the course and that only one jumper approaches it at a time.
    All jump[ers must continually scan the airspace around them during canopy descent and be prepared to abort their original landing plans in case of traffic problems or other hazards.
  10. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    29/06/2003 Northeast Pennsylvania Ripcords Inc, PA LOWT 26 94 Y/Y   #546795
    Description: The jumper turned low perhaps to avoid an obstacle or to turn back into wind and impacted on tarmac.
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    USPA Description: After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, this jumper was observed making a 180-degree turn at a low altitude and struck the ground at a high rate of speed before the turn was completed. He died at the scene from injuries sustained during the landing.
    USPA Conclusions:This jumper had recent;y returned to the sport after a long winter layoff. His previous canopy control was described as conservative. After he approached the landing area downwind, he apparently attempted to face into the wind for his landing, initiating a 180-degree turn at an extremely low altitude.
    It was not reported whether there were any obstacles that may have prevented him from landing crosswind or downwind. Winds were reported to be six to eight mph. His wing loading was estimated at 1.1:1, a wing loading that the manufacturer considers advanced.
    The USPA Integrated Student Program teaches students about wing loading and its effects to help them make informed choices about the equipment they will use as experienced jumpers. ISP students also learn braked turns and braked approaches through ground training and canopy exercises in flight. These exercises are designed to teach canopy control in braked flight and the benefit og altitude-conserving braked turns.
    Jumpers should plan landing patterns that allow for landings into clear areas free of obstacles. Turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.
  11. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    05/07/2003 Carolina Skysports, NC LOWT 26 800 Y/N   #555670
    Description: The jumper performed a high-performance low turn in order to enter a swoop course but failed to complete the turn in time and impacted with the ground before his canopy did. The jumper sustained multiple serious injuries including a severe blow to the head that led to high levels of inter-cranial pressure. Eight days later the doctors declared he was clinically brain dead and he was removed from the respiration machine the next day and his organs were donated.
    Lessons:The jumper had done approximately 500 jumps on a Vengeance 150 and had recently switched to the Jedei 120 on which he had approximately 40 jumps. Some of his landings in no-wind conditions had apparently injured him enough to stop him jumping for the weekend and had concerned his peers. He wanted to take part in a swoop competition yet hadn't attempted the course on his previous canopy before trying it with the more highly loaded canopy. The jumper was borrowing gear as he was unable to return to his own gear or other borrowed gear due to a lost freebag and harness damage being repaired by the manufacturer. It was his intention to sell his gear and downsize. Know the limitations of your skills and your equipment!
    USPA Description: After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, this jumper initiated a hard toggle turn at approximately 25 feet and struck the ground at the same time as the canopy while still in the turn. He suffered several broken bones and a severe head injury from the hard landing. He received immediate first aid and was airlifted to a hospital soon after the accident. He was removed from life support ten days after the accident
    USPA Conclusions:This jumper had a history of erratic landings and close calls while jumping a 150-square-foot canopy. He had been warned by several other jumpers and drop zone staff about his dangerous landings. In spite of this, he had recently purchased a 120-square-foot canopy and continued to have close calls and poor landings at an even higher wing loading of 2:1. The dropzone had recently placed a swoop course in the ladning area, and this jumper stated during the ride to altitude for this jump that he was going to swoop through the course. He was told by several jumpers not to attempt the swwop course but disregarded their advice.
    Jumpers who are experiencing canopy control problems should move up to larger parachutes and seek training from experienced canopy specialists. Jumpers should not downsize or attempt high-performance canopy flight without appropriate guidance and training. Jumpers must complete all turns with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.
  12. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    21/07/2003 Skydive Miami, FL BIZ,LAND 46 11 Y/Y   #578046
    Description: After an apparent AFF jump from 13,500 feet, the student deployed his canopy at around 5,000 feet. The parachute opened properly and at some point after the opening, the canopy started to spiral. There is a report that the jumpers body appeared limp in the harness. The jumper died after a hard landing. The manufacturers of the harness subsequently posted a service bulletin reporting a Main Lift Web adjuster on a student harness shearing through securing webbing which may or may not have resulted in a fatality.
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    USPA Description: An AFF student had performed routinely during a Category D training jump. However, he dropped his left arm and shoulder as he deployed his BOC pilot chute, causing him to dive head first and roll to te left. The main canopy opened without malfunctioning but proceeded to descen in a tight, spiraling turn. The jumper landed hard while still in a turn.
    USPA Conclusions:The student was jumping a parachute harness with an adjustable main lift web, commonly used by skydiving schools to accommodate different-sized people. Inspection of the gear revealed that the harness had failed where the left main lift web passes through the friction adapter adjustment hardware.
    Apparently, the failure of the left side of the harness caused the student to suddenly drop in the narness and catch his chin on the chest strap, breaking his neck. It is believed he was killed instantly. Hanging unevenly in the harness evidently caused his canopy to turn for the rest of his descent.
    The unstable deployment may have transferred an unusual amount of force to one point of the harness, but the exact reason for the harness failure had not been determined as of this report. The manufacturer has issued a service bulletin for any of the company's equipment with an adjustable harness. The bulletin advises that the assembly be inspected by an FAA rigger in the U.S. or a technician qualified in another country.
    The equipment hasn't been released by local authorities, nor has it been inspected in detail by the manufacturer or other knowledgeable source.
  13. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    26/07/2003 Eagles Skydiving, TX MAL 57 ?/?   #587657
    Description: The jumper was going to get off of student status that weekend. She went up to practice her graduation dive. front loop, back loop right 360, left 360. She did the sequence and then turned to track. Then she went into a slow turn until she pulled around 1000 - 1300 ft. Her canopy had a few line twists and it looked like it pinned her head down. I guess that she got nervous and cut away without checking her altimeter and landed under a partially inflated reserve. The altiometer didnt look like it was damaged on the outside, and the needle was resting on zero. The cypress did fire and the rig had an RSL. And she pulled the reserve handle. Everyone was shocked that she pulled under the hard deck. She always pulled when she was supposed to, even if she was on her back.
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  14. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    06/08/2003 Rantoul, IL MAL 59 546 Y/N   #601645
    Description: Spinning mal (the pilot chute was entangled over the right side of the canopy and wound up in the suspention lines causing a right dive.), low cutaway, no rsl, airtec report cutaway just over 600 ft. and the cypres did not fire until 116ft. agl.
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    USPA Description: Winessed saw this jumper spinning under his main canopy at a low altitude, at which point the main was released. The reserve parachute began deployment but did not clear its freebag before the jumper reached the ground. He died at the scene from injuries sustained on impact.
    USPA Conclusions:The cause of the spinning main canopy was not discovered in the investigation of the equipment. Data from his audible altimeter indicated a main canopy deployment at 2,2200 feet AGL. Data from his automatic activation device indicated a main canopy release at 652 feet AGL and a reserve deployment (initiated by the AAD) beginning at 116 to 122 feet. The reserve ripcord was found still in its pocket, and the cutaway handle was found 50 feet from the jumper. Witnesses reported seeing the jumper "attempting to get stable" after the main canopy release.
    The Skydiver's Information Manual recommends that B-,C- and D-licensed jumpers decided upon and execute emergency procedures by 1,800 feet and students and A-license holders by 2,500 feet. Initiating emergency procedures at a higher altitude, pulling the reserve ripcord immediately after the cutaway or the use of a reserve static line may have provided this jumper enough time for the reserve parachute to fully inflate.
    When asked about the expectations of this model of AAD if cutting away below its preset firing altitude of 750 feet, the U.S. representative for the manufacturer recommended that a jumper forget he has one one, adding that an RSL provides a better back-up for low cutaways.
    At some point during the descent under a partial malfunction, it becomes too low for a safe cutaway, and jumpers should deploy the reserve without cutaway. The ISP recommends that students choose an altitude of 1,000 feet to make that decision and that licensed jumpers decided upon a minimum cutaway altitude before jumping.
    Frequent practice of emergency procedures helps enable jumpers to take correct action when faced with a malfunction.
  15. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    29/08/2003 Skydive Arizona, AZ LAND 44 185 Y/Y   #637643
    Description: The jumper exited the aircraft at 13,000 feet and proceeded with a solo skydive. The jumper was seen under a fully inflated canopy and was proceeding to the South landing area. At approximately 2,000 feet the jumper initiated a spiral and continued in spiral until impact with the ground.
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    USPA Description: After an uneventful solo skydive and initial canopy descent, this jumper began a canopy spiral at approximately 2,000 feet AGL, which continued until he struck the ground.
    USPA Conclusions:Witnesses observed that the main parachute appeared to be fully open with no visible problems. A designated parachute rigger examiner inspected the gear and also found nothing wrong. The jumper had a history of spiraling his main canopy, often through busy traffic to low altitudes before stopping the spin. Drop zone staff had spoken to him on several occasions regarding his canopy control. He may have become disoriented from the spin or lost altitude awareness. For whatever reason, he continued the spiral all the way to the ground and was killed by the hard impact.
    A jumper should spiral his canopy only after establishing that there is clear airspace and that the sprial will not interfere with any other canopy traffic. All turns must be completed with enough altitude to allow the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.
  16. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    14/09/2003 Finger Lakes Skydiving, NY LOWT 36 1000 Y/N   #660887
    Description: The jumper was demoing a canopy well within his capabilties (according to those who knew him well - normally jumped a Crossfire 109 and had experience of Velocity 103 and Crossfire 99), He initiated his final turn too low, and planed out his canopy too late. He struck a driveway with great force. Emergency personel initiated CPR but the jumper died. The jumper was not wearing a helmet but it is unlikely it wqould have made any difference.
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    USPA Description: After an uneventful solo freefall and initial canopy descent, this jumper initiated a 180-degree turn at approximately 250 feet above the ground. He completed the turn before reaching the ground but reportedly made little or no attempt to flare the canopy before he struck the ground at a high rate of speed. He died at the scene from his injuries.
    USPA Conclusions:This was the jumper's third jump on a 96-square foot cross-braced canopy. His wing loading, estimated at 1.72:1, is considered advanced by the manufacturer. Surface winds were roprted between two and four mph but 30mph at 3,000 feet. The jumperlanded on the downwind side of a row of trees, which may have affected the flight of the canopy.
    This jumper's regular canopy was reported to be 108 square feet and of a conventional rib design typically associated with more docile performance characteristics and quicker recovery from a turn. Cross-braced canopies are known to require hundreds of feet to recover from performance turns for safe landings. Expert cross-braced canopy pilots routinely start such maneuvers above 500 feet.
    Section 6-10 of the 2004 Skydiver's Information Manual recommends that a jumper advancing to a higher-performance wing does so at the same square footage as a familiar canopy. A jumper should land any new design or smaller canopy conservatively until learning that canopy's flight characteristics in the entire range of control inputs and weather conditions.
    On any canopy, jumpers must complete all turns with enough altitude for the canopy to reurn to straight an level flight for the landing flare.
  17. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    26/09/2003 Perris, CA MAL 47 1700 Y/Y   #682571
    Description: The stowing of excess brake line through the riser caused it to wrap around the tab of a slink. The jumper spent too long trying to solve problem and lost altitude awareness under a spinning canopy. It appears the jumper encountered a similar malfunction a month prior and performed her emergency procedures with enough time to land safely. It is possible that people's reaction to her dealing with this emergency may have caused her to attempt deal woth it longer when it happened again. The jumper was taking part in a big way which may have contributeds to the possibility that she didn't release her brakes shortly after deployment to perform a controlability check above a reasonable hard dark. The jumper was unable to counter the spin with the other toggle or perhaps a hook knife.
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    USPA Description: After a successful freefall with a large group, this jumper was observed under a spinning main canopy, which continued to spin to the ground. She was found a short distance from the main landing area, but she had already died of multiple landing injuries.
    USPA Conclusions:Inspection of the equipment revealed that the steering line on the right side of the canopy had become entangled with the locking tab of one of the fabric-style connector links used to attach the canopy suspension lines to the riser. Connector links are provided by the canopy manufacturer as part of the main canopy assembly. Cloth links are often supplied as an alternative to more traditional metal loop links, secured by a barrel nut. This model, called a Slink, is one of several types of fabric link, typically made from Spectra suspension line and looped over a head made from fabric, in this case, or other material.
    The slider was stowed, and the jumper had pulled the toggles to release the brakes. However, the canopy began to spin due to the trapped steering line. It is not known why this jumper did not release the main parachute and deploy her reserve while still high enough. She may have lost altitude awareness while dealing with the problem. Also, this 120-square foot canopy, even with a relatively light wing loading, can turn and lose altitude very quickly, which can add to a jumper's disorientation during a malfunction.
    In cases such as this, where a steering line has been disabled and creates a turn in the canopy, it may be possible to neutralize the turn by pulling the opposite toggle to an equal distance. The jumper would then have to determine whether it's safe to land in that configuration, not necessarily a good idea, with a smaller or highly loaded canopy.
    Skydiver's Information Manual Section 5-1 recommends that whenever the main canopy cannot be controlled safely, jumpers should initiate emergency procedures no lower than 2,500 feet AGL for students and A-license holders or 1,800 feet AGL for B- through D-license holders.
    Jumpers should take care to stow excess steering line in a way that will allow for the brakes to release without any interference.
  18. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    27/09/2003 Parachutes Are Fun, DE DMAL 54 12 Y/?   #683138
    Description: The jumper was making his 12th jump.the jumper was witnessed by another jumper on the load at approximately 7,000 feet in "a violent spin on his back, pulling frantically on what appeared to be the jump suit or chest strap, near the reserve handle". The Cypres fired and the reserve lines entangled with the jumpers body preventing the reserve from inflating fully. He impacted close to a highway route.
    Lessons:
  19. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    04/10/2003 Lodi, CA LOWT 21 44 Y/Y   #697254
    Description: It appears this recent AFF graduate jumper was determined to purchase an inappropriate canopy for his skill level. He was not allowed to jump it at the dropzone where he regularly jumped and travelled to another so that he could, before reyturning to his home in Vancouver He suffered blunt-force trauma to his body, broken legs, multiple broken bones, a crushed pelvis and multiple pulmonary contusions. He died in hospital a couple of days later from these massive injuries.
    Lessons:
    USPA Description: After an uneventful freefall and initial canopy descent, this jumper initiated a 270-degree turn at 50 feet above a highway. He struck the ground while still in a diving turn and suffered multiple broken bones and internal injuries, as well as a head injury. He was airlifted from the accident scene and died in a hospital four days later.
    USPA Conclusions:This very inexperienced jumper was making his tenth jump on an elliptical canopy marketed to jumpers seeking higher performance flight characteristics. The manufacturer recommends this jumper's wing loading, 1.1:1, for jumpers at the upper end of the intermediate experience level.
    The report did not indicate that the jumper turned to miss any obstacles in the landing area. However, he may have been attempting a high-performance landing maneuver. Another jumper reported that before the jump, this jumper had indicated a desire to practice a "swoop turn." Regardless of the reason for the low turn, this jumper apparently did not understand the consequences of initiating an aggressive turn at such a low altitude.
    The USPA Integrated Student Program includes canopy exercises to help familiarize jumpers at any experience level with their current canopies. It recommends performing the exercises high and in clear airspace.
    The ISP also has information on wing loading and canopy design to educate new jumpers regarding canopy performance and how wing loading and canopy design affect canopy flight.
    Jumpers should not downsize or change to different canopy design to educate new jumpers regarding cano
  20. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    05/10/2003 Colorado City, CO EXC 30 700 N/?   #693618
    Description: The jumper exited a plane with another jumper at approximately 5000 ft. Both were wearing wingsuits and flying in close proximity to each other. One was to fly under the Royal Gorge bridge and the other to fly over it. The jumper attempting to fly over it, tried to pass between horizontal and vertical supports on both sides of the bridge. The jumper miscalculated his route whilst crossing the bridge and struck a railing on the opposite side, upon which the canopy immediately deployed. The jumper landed on a ledge above the river below. Climbers made their way down and confirmed he was dead.
    Lessons:
    USPA Description: This jumper was one of three who reportedly exited a Cessna Caravan at an altitude of 5,000 feet AGL for a wingsuit jump during a weekend long BASE jumping event at a suspension bridge. The public had been invited, and many spectators were on the bridge. This jumper reportedly inteded to cross 100 to 200 feet over the crowd, while one of the others passed just below the span. Both jumpers planned to deploy below the bridge, which is approximately 1,000 feet above the gorge it spans.
    The jumper who planned to fly over the bridge reportedly approached lower than planned, struck the railing near the spectators and was probably killed instantly. According to the report, his parachute opened upon impact with the bridge, flew him into the wall of the gorge and remained there until rescuers arrived.
    USPA Conclusions:Witnesses and investigators reported that the jumper was approaching the bridge with enough altitude to clear the span but apparently intentionally collapsed the wings of his wingsuiut, putting him on a trajectory closer to the bridge and the crowd. He passed below the support cables for the span but did not have enough altitude to clear the railing on the deck of the bridge.
    To fly into and below the bridge, both jumpers had to freefall with their wingsuits well below the 2,000 foot AGL minimum deployment altitude required by the USPA. Serveral Federal Aviation Regulations apparently were also disregarded. The USPA investigation revealed that the jumper apparently left the aircraft without the single-harness, dual-parachute system the FAA requires for jumping from aircraft, instead using a single parachute designed for fixed-object jumping.
    The FAA also prohibits jumps over an open-air assembly of people without a certificate of authorization. In general, the FAA prohibits any jump that creates a hazard to persons or property on the surface.
    In planning exhibition jumps, skydivers must consider the safety of the jumpers and the spectators first. In this case, the apparently initentional violations of the USPA's BSRs and the FARs, all meant to protect the jumpers and the spectators, resulted in a tragic outcome fro all present.
  21. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    01/11/2003 Coolidge, AZ DMAL 26 964 N/N   #744629
    Description: The jump was from a twin otter, and planned tandem video. The tandem exited last, at an altitude of 9500 agl.(due to broken cloud layer ceiling) 7 jumpers exited prior to the tandem and videogapher...all were uneventful skydives. The videographer experienced a malfunction at pull time possibly associated with a non-cocked pilot chute or a pilot chute in-tow. The jumpers own video indicated a extended free fall, with no main deployment. The jumper initiated his EPs by his reserve handle first. It is likely the release of pressure on the main in the container allowed it to drop below him and began to inflate between his legs. With the reserve fully inflated, the main inflated with suspension lines wrapped around jumpers right leg. Jumpers own Video shows him grabbing and pulling the cut away pillow, then tries to free himself from main suspension lines. The tension between the main and reserve canopy caused a downplane configuration. He cleared himself of the lines. As the main left, the right main riser became tangled with the right rear riser of the reserve, resulting in whipped cinch knot. This was was observed at the accident site. The jumper died of his injuries moments after impact.
    Lessons:Not an easy situation to deal with. The outcome may have been different if the deceased had cutaway first. Then again, he may have impacted without pulling anything after wasting time cutting away. This jumper didn't give up and nor should you. Make sure you have a plan.
    USPA Description: After an uneventful freefall filming a tandem jump, this jumper threw his pilot chut to initiate deployment but experienced a pilot-chute-in-tow malfunction. He responded by deploying his reserve, which opended normally. However, as the reserve deployed, the main parachute also deployed, with the lines entangling around the jumper's legs before it inflated. The jumper released the main parachute and then freed his legs, but the cutaway main canopy entangled with the reserve risers and the reserve ripcord. The two canopies began to spin around each other in a downplane configuration, with both canopies diving the rest of the way to the ground. He died at the scene from the hard landing.
    USPA Conclusions:As in many fatal accidents, a chain of events culminated in the outcome, and changing any of them may have prevented it. The jumper picked one of two acceptable options to respoind to the malfunction and pulled the reserve. In this case, the reserve deployed and inflated normally, and then it appears - as often happens - that the release of tension on the container from the reserve activation allowed the collapsed pilot chute to deploy the main parachute. Unfortunately, the bad tumbled below him as the lines unstowed, and the lines entangled with the jumper's leg or legs. A cutaway ight have been useless up to this point, because the main parachute had not fully deployed. Also, it was discovered that the riser release system had stiffened from lack of maintenance and may have required more force than usual to disengage.
    By the time the jumper had freed his legs from the linesm the main had inflated. The left riser released, and the main canopy rotated around behind the jumper. During this rotation, the right-side main riser released and entangled with the right-side reserve riser and the reserve ripcord still in his hand, locking the two risers together.
    At that point, the jumper apparently, released the brakes on the reserve, and the two canopies began a diving right turn. The jumper spent the remaining time trying to free the main canopy.
    While dealing with this malfunction, this jumper found himself several times in relatively unchharted waters. He might have released the main too early in the sequence of events, but there are no clear-cut procedures for dealing with an entanglement once the reserve parachute is deployed. There are alos pros and cons to jettisoning the reserve ripcord while executing malfunction procedures. After the downplane began, it may have been a better choice to recover control of the reserve. Certainly, he was doing the best he could and continued working with the situation until he struck the ground.
    However, some choices made prioer to the jumper could have been handled better. The first and foremost preventable factor was the initial pilot-chute-in-tow malfunction. Most often - and apparently the cause of this instance - the problem results from not fully seating or cocking the inner bridle on a kill-line collapsible pilot chute. A jumper can prevent this problem with careful packing followed by a routine equipment check before putting on the gear. Most collapsible main pilot chute bridles have a window to show that the kill line is in the right position inside the bridle. Second, performing the recommended periodic maintenance may have allowed the risers to release more freely and resulted in a clearner cutaway. Finally, larger parachutes would have provided a slower descent rate, which may have allowed for more time in a spinning situation to regain control and possibly led to a survivable landing.
  22. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    01/11/2003 Skydive Atalanta, GA CCOL 30 650 Y/?   #736999
    Description: This jumper collided with the canopy of his fiancé at approximately 100 feet. He later died from his injuries although his fiancé his expected to make a full recovery.
    Lessons:
    USPA Description: A group of 20 jumpers were descending after a routine freefall jump. Two of the first one to land collided at a reported 50 to 100 feet above the ground. The canopies briefly entangled but separated shortly after the collision, and both jumpers landed hard under partially inflated parachutes. One jumper died soon afterward from head injuries. The other jumper was also seriously injured but survived.
    USPA Conclusions:Prior to the collision, witnesses observed the jumper who was to survive the accident flying a straight-in landing approach. Witnesses reported seeing the other jumper turn his canopy between 90 and 180 degrees and then collide with the canopy on the straight-in approach. There were no other reported canopy traffic issues, and most of the other jumpers were still above them.
    Jumpers must always maintain clear air space around them and check carefully before turning to prevent collisions. The base leg and final approach zone over a landing area are the most likely places for a canopy collision. There especially, skydivers should continually scan for traffic and plan ahead for safe descents.
    Jumpers using low turns to induce speed for high-performance landings must be absolutely certain the area is clear of approaching canopies. This added responsibility has on a number of occasions proven too much for even highly experienced jumpers, seriously injured or killed after making an error and sometimes hurting or killing the other jumper. For this reason, high-performance landings into a common landing area should be of serious concern to all jumpers.
  23. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    22/11/2003 Deland, FL LOWT 29 275 ?/?   #773452
    Description: The jumper was taking part in a wingsuit flocking dive, which exited 3.5 miles away from the dropzone, downwind. When the base built it was flying in the wrong direction. Several experienced jumpers broke off to head back to the dropzone and witnessed the rest of the group doing so later on. The experienced jumpers who broke off early deployed high and a few made it back to the dropzone. This jumper could not make it back to the intended landing area and it appears he initiated a last minute turn to avoid a concrete pole. He suffered multiple injuries and died later in the hospital.
    Lessons:Where you open your canopy should not come as a surprise to you, make sure you look where you are at least once in the skydive. When landing off, choose an adequate landing area in plenty of time and don't cut down your margins by trying to shorten your walk back to the dropzone. Learn and practice how to flat turn as this could have made a significant difference in the outcome.
    USPA Description: This jumper was part of a group flying wingsuits. The group opened their parachutes too far away from the drop zone to land on the airport. This jumper and two others from his groups chose a field near a tall section of trees. Winds were reported to be ten to 15 mph at treetop level but near zero below the trees. This jumper made a hard left turn at a low altitude and struck the ground while still in the turn. He died from injuries sustained during the resulting hard landing. The other two two jumpers landed without incident.
    USPA Conclusions:This jumper had a wing loading estiamted to be 1.3:1, which the manufacturer recommends for expert jumpers. The manufacturer explains that "expert" refers to "some of the best pilots in the world."
    In the past three years, there have been 13 fatalities from low turns near the ground made not to enhance the landing speed, but rather made in error from poor judgement and understanding of the result of the turn. Eleven of the 13 involved newer jumpers with wing loadings between 1:1 and 1.4:1 and off-field landings. In each case, the turn was initiated either to avoid an obstacle or to attempt to face into wind for landing.
    The Integrated Student Programme in Section 4 of the Skydiver's Information Manual contains information on wing loading and canopy dive flows that can help educate both students and licensed jumpers about the canopies they are jumping. Section 6-10 of the SIM provides information on downsizing and advanced canopy flight, which can further educate skydivers of all experience levels. Jumpers who find it easy to repeatedly land a faster parachute on the drop zone may find that same canopy much more difficult to negotiate into a smaller landing area surrounded by obstacles.
    Ultimately, all turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.
  24. Date Location Category Age # Jumps AAD?/RSL? Dropzone.com Report Dropzone.com Discussion
    31/12/2003 Gold Cost Skydivers, MS LOWT,EXC 34 1334 ?/?    
    Description: This experienced, respected skydiver and drop zone staff member was attempting a high-performance landing at night. He miscalculated and hit the ground at high speed, suffering a severe head trauma. He was rushed to hospital where he died from his injuries a short time later.
    Lessons:A high-performance landing under an extreme wing loading is difficult at the best of times. Attempting the same at night with less visual reference greatly increases the risk.
    USPA Description: After an uneventful exit and initial canopy descent from 4,000 feet during a night jump, this jumper initiated a 180-degree turn at a low altitude and struck the ground hard while the canopy was still in a dive. He received immediate medical attention, but he died from the hard impact and the resulting head injuries.
    USPA Conclusions:The jump was made using a high-performance cross-braced canopy at a wing loading estimated to be 2.1:1. At 1,334 total jumps, this jumper had made a very aggressive choice for canopy design and wing loading, particularly for a night jump. His experience under this canopy was not reported.

    The jump took place late in the evening during a drop zone celebration of a major holiday. Toxicology reports indicated he was drunk and under the influence of cocaine. His blood-alcohol level was .30 percent, which is nearly four times the .08 legal limit to operate a motor vehicle in most states. As a result of this incident, USPA expelled the USPA-member pilot of the plane and another senior jumper who participated in the jump and disciplined less harshly the other jumpers on board the aircraft. All were determined to have knowledge of the intoxicated condition of the jumper who was killed.

    Obviously, drugs and alcohol adversely affect overall awareness, judgment and motor skills and have no place in skydiving, much less the highly technical skill of making a high-performance landing at night under a heavily loaded competition-model canopy. Alcohol can also interact with other drugs with unpredictable results. Judging distances at night while in freefall and under canopy can be difficult and requires a clear mind and the ability to concentrate on the task. Federal Aviation Regulation 105.7—and, therefore, SIM Section 2-1.B.1 (BSRs)—prohibits jumping under the influence of alcohol or drugs. FAR 91.17 prohibits a pilot from carrying a person who appears to be intoxicated.

    The jumper was not wearing a helmet, which might have reduced the severity of his head injury; however, he was reported to have struck the ground so hard that it may not have mattered.

    Ultimately, all turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.