Note 1: A single page collecting much of the information around grommet-related incidents can be found at: http://www.makeithappen.com/spsj/grom2.html

Note 2: The Australian Parachute Federation issued a service bulletin in 10/98 concerning exactly this issue. You can read about it here: http://www.apf.asn.au/apfdocs/apfsb981001a.pdf .

The other report follows: The wrappee was on straight final from over the taxiway (landing toward the east-northeast.) The wrapper (fatality) flew into him from the south consistent with a right hand 90 degree approach pattern. Other people on the load indicated that they had a good spot and were all coming from the runway side of the DZ. The wrap lasted a very short time and the low guy came out with a full canopy with line twist, in very deep brakes. The canopy never gained any airspeed and it fully stalled. When he hit the tarmac just south of the fuel pumps, he hit flat on his back. A pulse or airway was never restored. He was 200 lbs and was flying a Spectre 190, implying a loading of around 1.1 lb/ft^2.

On about the team's 30th jump, one of the jumpers opened with twisted lines, and this jumper's canopy opened off heading, lfying rapidly toward the jumper with line twists. He apparently collided chest first into the other's reserve container. Both were seriously injured , and this jumper landed apparently unconcious in straight and level flight with his brakes still stowed. Shortly after arriving at the hospital, he died from a reptured aorta, evidently sustained during the mid-air collision. The other jumper is expected to recover from his injuries.

Although one jumper may have a line twist, the other jumpers in a group are usually flying away. In this case, the line twist from one jumper combined with the off-heading opening of the other, casuing the two to close at a high speed before either could react to avoid a collision.

Jumpers need to gain sufficient separation after each jump to open in clear airspace and remain clear after opening, regardless of their experience or familiarity with the type of jumper and the other jumpers on the load. Jumpers must also consider their equipment requirement into their planned breakoff altitudes, allowing sufficient altitude for everyone to track clear.

This jumper weighed 185 pounds without gear, for a wing loading of 1.4 pounds per square foot, which would be considered very aggressive for his experience. The lack of helmet may have also been a factor in this fatality.

He deployed his reserve parachute at 1,000 feet, still traveling very fast. The reserve suffered structural damage and broken lines, resulting in an uncontrollable spin. The landing resulted in a broken leg, and internal injuries. The jumper died during surgery from internal bleeding.

The jumper reportedly weighed 225 pounds with gear, but his reserve was limited to a maximum suspended load (at sea level) of 202 pounds.

This jumper was engaged in a high-speed maneuver down to an altitude that did not allow sufficient time to slow down for deployment. The combination of high altitude, high deployment speed and excessive suspended weight proved to be more than the reserve parachute could handle. This parachute had a top skin constructed of zero-permeability fabric.

Jumpers need to be aware that exceeding the rated deployment spee dor maximum suspended weight of a canopy increases the chance of equipment failure. Precautions must be made to prevent premature openings and to allow plenty of time to lsow down before deployment.

A witness said that the jumper made no obvious attempt to release from the main canopy or deploy his reserve. The jumper was found with one hand grasping a partially removed cutaway handle. The reserve handle was removed from its pocket but not pulled.

This jumper was used to a 150-square-foot rectangular canopy and borrowed this 135-square-foot semi-elliptical canopy for this jump. He weighed an estimated 160 pounds without gear for a wing loading of approximately 1.3 pounds per square foot, well outside the manufacturer's recommendations. He was also exceeding the maximum suspended weight recommended for the main canopy. More violent malfunctions are on result of higher wing loading.

The Skydiver's Information Manual recommends that a jumper faced with a partial malfunction should decide to cut away by no lower than 1,800 feet and to execute the decision by no lower than 1,600 feet. It is possible that either this jumper became confused and lost track of time and altitude or was expecting to clear the problem. Also, a hard spiral, if allowed to continue, could feasibly cause a person to lose conciousness due to loss of blood flow to the brain. The jumper eventually may have become incapacitated as a result of the spin and unable to perform the necessary action.

It's possible that this jumper became disorientated during the hard spirals before he turned downwind. It could have affected his depth perception.

Most jumpers would consider his experience level very low to attempt this type of maneuver. Worse, this jumper weighed 215 pounds without gear, loading this 170-square-foot canopy at approximately 1.4 pounds per sqaure foot. This canopy is no longer sold, so it is not a new design. Regardless, his canopy choice would have to be termed aggressive, considering his lack of experience.

When a turn is made to induce speed prior to landing (high-performance landing), it must be executed high enough for the canopy to return to straight and level flight before the flare for landing.

Additional care must be taken when ladning at a DZ with a higher altitude above sea level than a jumper may be used to. Manufacturers' specifications and recommendations are often based on data gathered at sea level. It was not reported whether the jumper was from that area or familiar with landing at such a high field elevation.

Investigation of the accident revealed that the reserve bridle had wrapped around the free bag,a deployment bag that containes the reserve canopy, preventing the reserve canopy from inflating.

An arched, stable body position during the emergency procedures would have given himthe best possible chance for a clean reserve deployment.

After he did not return to the DZ, a search found him slumped over face-first in a pond at a depth of three feet. The main container wsa closed with the main pilot chute still in place. The reserve canopy was open.

Investigation indicates that the jumper pulled both the cutaway and the reserve ripcord handles. But a telltale kink in the reserve ripcord, evidence of an RSL activation, indicates that the RSL had at some point activated the reserve. The reserve bridle was found entangled with the right main line group.

The reserve may have been activated accidentally, or the jumper could have pulled the reserve ripcord prior to a cutaway for whatever reason.

It is important that every skydive include a plan for breakoff and canopy descent, regardless of the number of people in the group. Each jumper needs adequate clearance from other jumpers during deployment to allow for an off-heading opening or other problem. This becomes more important with faster-flying canopies.

He was jumping this canopu with an estimated wing loading of 1.3:1. This is a high wing loading by any standard for someone with so few jumps stretched over such a long time.

Canopy training prior to jumping this new gear may have prevented him from making the error. Turns must be completed high enough to allow the canopy to return to straight and level flight before the flare.