This jumper was flying a canopy loaded well under 1.0 lb/ft^2. Even with a lightly loaded canopy, it is very possible to hammer yourself into the ground. This problem is not just a feature of highly loaded canopies. Any canopy flown improperly can maim or kill.

From rec.skydiving: "According to the short form report of the pathologist's results, he died of severe thoracic trauma and lasted less than five minutes after impact. As I understand it, the extent of his injuries was such that immediate medical attention may not have saved him. The broken femur didn't help, but it wasn't the cause of death. From what I can gather, he impacted knees first at a speed consistent with an unflared landing in a turn. His chest strap and helmet were removed, and he wasn't wearing gloves. Civilians who arrived on the scene first said that he seemed to have removed his rig, taken off his helmet and gloves, laid down and died, but a closer look showed that he likely pulled off his helmet and clawed out of his harness as he succumbed to his injuries. "

This was the pair's first day at the boogie, and landing at the beach was strictly prohibited. The beach was a difficult landing area, water, 40' of sand, then pine trees, plus quite full of people.

This jumper weighed 185 pounds without gear, for a wing loading of 1.4 pounds per square foot, which would be considered very aggressive for his experience. The lack of helmet may have also been a factor in this fatality.

It's possible that this jumper became disorientated during the hard spirals before he turned downwind. It could have affected his depth perception.

Most jumpers would consider his experience level very low to attempt this type of maneuver. Worse, this jumper weighed 215 pounds without gear, loading this 170-square-foot canopy at approximately 1.4 pounds per sqaure foot. This canopy is no longer sold, so it is not a new design. Regardless, his canopy choice would have to be termed aggressive, considering his lack of experience.

When a turn is made to induce speed prior to landing (high-performance landing), it must be executed high enough for the canopy to return to straight and level flight before the flare for landing.

Additional care must be taken when ladning at a DZ with a higher altitude above sea level than a jumper may be used to. Manufacturers' specifications and recommendations are often based on data gathered at sea level. It was not reported whether the jumper was from that area or familiar with landing at such a high field elevation.

Jumpers must be aware that control of the canopy must be kept at all times, especially a highly-wing-loaded elliptical during the last 300 feet. Front-riser maneuvers, for example, must be made with toggles in hand. A jumper performing any kind of diving maneuver near the ground must also be familiar with all the canopy controls, including rear risers, and prepared to use them as needed.

Having his hands out of the toggles and not using back risers kept this jumper from being able to safely flare and land his canopy.

He suffered multiple fractures and internal injuries, including two broken femurs, a broken back,a torn aorta, a ruptured spleen and a damaged kidney. He was airlifted to a hospital, where he survived on life support for nearly a month. He died shortly after it was withdrawn.

Jumpers need to thoroughly understand their current canopies before deciding to downsize. Jumpers who wish to perform high-performance landings should accept advice and receive training from an experienced canopy specialist, which could ofset some of the extreme risk of this activity.

In any event, jumpers must complete all turns under canopy with enough altitude to return to straight and level flight before the time to begin the landing flare.

Jumpers who wish to make high-performance landings must approach high-performance canopy flight with extreme caution, using a structured process with the guidance of an experienced canopy specialist. Inthis case, there was no mention of his previous canopy landing experience.

Jumpers must complete all turns under canopy with enough altitude to return to straight and level flight before beginning the landing flare.

Rachel Gray was carrying out a solo jump. Her canopy was seen to deploy at the correct altitude, (between 2-3000ft AGL), and was seen to be flying correctly.

There had been very little wind at the time of the accident and all parachutists on board the aircraft had been instructed, prior to take off, by the CCI to land facing in a southerly direction.

Prior to the accident Rachel had completed only three jumps during 2002. These had all been within the previous six weeks. With 432 jumps, she was an experienced parachutist. However, the Board believes that this lack of currency, together with the low wind speed, may have contributed to Rachel making the incorrect decision to turn so low to the ground.

At approximately 100ft AGL Rachel’s canopy, which was flying in a northerly direction, was observed to make a radical left turn, impacting with the ground before the turn was completed.

All parachutes deployed normally and Oliver’s parachute appeared to be flying correctly. At approximately 200ft AGL his parachute was observed to be flying over the landing area designated for Experienced Parachutists, approximately 100 metres from the parachute centre buildings and control point. At a very low altitude Oliver’s parachute was seen to make a radical turn, either left or right, (there was some confliction between witnesses as to the direction of turn). The parachute completed approximately 180° of the turn, at which point he impacted with the ground.

The Board do not know why Oliver made such a radical turn so close to the ground and can only conclude that he was not aware of how low he was prior to initiating the turn, or that he may have felt he could have executed the turn successfully.

All parachutes deployed normally and the deceased’s parachute appeared to be flying correctly. At some stage his parachute was seen to fly past the intended landing area and at approximately 100ft AGL was observed to be facing the parachute into wind, approximately 100 metres short (down wind) of the intended landing area. His parachute was then seen to make a sharp left hand turn, completing approximately 90° before impacting with a concrete area of the ground.

Following the investigation, the Board came to the following Conclusions:

The deceased made an uneventful free fall descent. He deployed his main parachute at the correct altitude. He remained upwind for the majority of the descent. He over-flew the intended landing area and because of the wind strength and/or possibly due to a lack of judgement, ended up too far down-wind to enable him to get back to the intended landing area.

Being over an area which contained a number of minor hazards, the Board believe that he then decided to pull down on both his front risers, in an effort to gain extra ‘drive’ in the hope of landing closer to his original intended landing area.

The Board believe that when he pulled his front risers down, he may have also pulled on the right connector link protection ‘tube’ and pulled it loose from the connector link. The riser may then have slipped up, through the ‘tube’, having the same effect as releasing that riser, which could have caused a very sharp turn to the left.

It is also possible that he could have made a sharp intentional turn to the left, though the Board believe this is unlikely. It is also possible that as he was nearing the ground, he may have been distracted, acknowledging a friend who was below him, though, it is unlikely that this would have affected the outcome of this tragic accident.

The jump took place late in the evening during a drop zone celebration of a major holiday. Toxicology reports indicated he was drunk and under the influence of cocaine. His blood-alcohol level was .30 percent, which is nearly four times the .08 legal limit to operate a motor vehicle in most states. As a result of this incident, USPA expelled the USPA-member pilot of the plane and another senior jumper who participated in the jump and disciplined less harshly the other jumpers on board the aircraft. All were determined to have knowledge of the intoxicated condition of the jumper who was killed.

Obviously, drugs and alcohol adversely affect overall awareness, judgment and motor skills and have no place in skydiving, much less the highly technical skill of making a high-performance landing at night under a heavily loaded competition-model canopy. Alcohol can also interact with other drugs with unpredictable results. Judging distances at night while in freefall and under canopy can be difficult and requires a clear mind and the ability to concentrate on the task. Federal Aviation Regulation 105.7—and, therefore, SIM Section 2-1.B.1 (BSRs)—prohibits jumping under the influence of alcohol or drugs. FAR 91.17 prohibits a pilot from carrying a person who appears to be intoxicated.

The jumper was not wearing a helmet, which might have reduced the severity of his head injury; however, he was reported to have struck the ground so hard that it may not have mattered.

Ultimately, all turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.

His canopy was observed to be over the PLA from approximately 500ft. He was then seen to make a radical turn at a low altitude, of approximately 270°s impacting with the ground whilst still in the turn.

He had successfully made a number of ‘swoop’ type landings previously. The Board believe that on this occasion he had miscalculated the minimum height needed to complete the turn in order to successfully achieve the ’swoop’ landing. This resulted in him striking the ground at high speed.

It is not known whether he had received any formal coaching for ‘swoop’ type landings.

The Recommendation of the Board is that parachutists should be reminded of the possible consequences of radical turns close to the ground.

Medical help reached him within about 45 seconds and stabilized him. He had two broken femurs (one open) and serious facial/cranial injuries. He was life-flighted out. He was taken off life support and passed away 2 days later.

He was jumping an elliptical canopy at a wing loading of 1.6:1. The report did not state how many jumps he had made on this canopy, but his total number of jumps make this an aggressive canopy choice. He may have been descending more quickly than he expected either in level flight, during the front-riser turn or both.

The report also did not mention whether the jumper was attempting a high-performance landing or simply attempting to land in the same direction as the other jumpers on the load. For whatever reason, the jumper initiated the final turn without sufficient altitude and struck the ground hard while still in a turn. The landing area was surrounded by open desert on three sides, which would have provided a flat, unobstructed landing area. The jumper could have abandoned plans to land in the main landing area at any point during the descent before initiating the fatal turn. The report also pointed out that the jumper could have made a 90-degree left turn instead and probably landed safely in a clear area.

Jumpers working toward a high-performance wing loading such as this should downsize in small increments and only after becoming thoroughly familiar with their current canopies. In general, jumpers should plan and follow landing patterns that provide safe approaches and landings, whether on the intended drop zone or into an alternate area. All turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.

The belief is that as he was getting closer to the ground, he may have noticed a wire fence in his flight path and then initiated a radical turn in order to avoid the hazard. He then struck the ground at high speed before fully completing the turn.

Club members were dispatched, in various vehicles, to retrieve the parachutists. The police contacted the parachute centre to inform them that the body of a parachutist had been located, which was approximately 2,000 metres from the parachute centre, on a wind farm, some thirty metres from a wire fence and also approximately 100 metres from a wind turbine.

The deceased made an uneventful free fall descent, deployed his main parachute at the correct altitude, but possibly had difficulty locating the PLA. Between him and the PLA were a number of ‘National Grid’ power lines and two very large wind turbines. It was likely that he decided not to attempt to fly his parachute over or past these hazards, as he was seen to be spiralling his parachute, and that he elected to land in a field to the west of them.

The Board believe that as he was getting closer to the ground, he may have noticed a wire fence in his flight path and then initiated a radical turn in order to avoid the hazard. He then struck the ground at high speed before fully completing the turn.

This same main canopy was linked to a fatality in 2002.

Skydiver's Information Manual Sections 6-10 and 6-11 provide guidance and recommendations for advanced canopy training, as well as canopy choice and downsizing recommendations. Canopies at this size and wing loading exceed the scope of the SIM and require specialized information and expertise to fly safely, available only through qualified canopy coaches. Jumpers who wish to make high-performance landings should engage an experienced canopy pilot as a coach and follow a structured training program to reduce the risks of this very demanding discipline. The SIM also recommends that jumpers who have downsized to this level without performing such advanced maneuvers learn them on a larger canopy first.

This jumper was wearing a camera helmet; however, the force of her landing resulted in severe head and neck injuries beyond the helmet's ability to protect her.

Final report mentions that a blood test taken 4.5 hours after the accident revealed a blood THC level (from Canabis) at 0.010 micromol. At the time of the accident, this value is estimated to have been somewhere between 2 to 20 times higher.

The aircraft climbed to approximately 12,000ft AGL and a ‘jump run’ was made over the PLA. Once the aircraft was at the estimated exit point, the parachutists began to exit the aircraft. Two groups of two parachutists exited first, followed by two solo parachutists. The deceased, who was videoing a Tandem pair then exited with them. The free fall part of the descent went without incident. He was observed under canopy and his parachute appeared to be flying normally. At a low altitude his parachute was observed to make some radical spiral turns and impacted with the ground before the parachute regained level flight.

a) That whilst turning the parachute low to the ground, and because of the configuration of the lights attached to his helmet, a control line may have fouled one of the lights on his helmet, thereby making it difficult to get the parachute into level flight again. However, when inspecting the equipment the Board could find no evidence to support this and feel that this possibility is unlikely.

b) That he elected to make some radical turns and misjudged his altitude making the turns too low to the ground and was unable to get his parachute back into level flight to make a safe landing.

c) That he switched off his video camera once his parachute had deployed and was paying attention to turning the camera back on while still in a radical turn, low to the ground. He may have been hindered by the configuration of the lights attached to his helmet and have been unaware of his close proximity to the ground, thereby misjudging his height and have been unable to get his parachute under control and to level out in order to land safely.

After viewing his videotape many times, the Board believes that the camera was switched on only 2 to 3 seconds before he struck the ground.

The Board is of the opinion, having viewed previous descents made by him, that sometimes his practice was to switch off his camera once his parachute had deployed and then switch it back on at a lower altitude before landing.

The Board concludes that c), above is the most likely possibility.

He was found with the left toggle still in his hand, hand fully extended downwards.

This jumper was landing off the normal landing area into a field close to the drop zone; he had flown his canopy downwind of the intended landing area for unknown reasons. Investigators suspect that he then made a last-second turn in an attempt to avoid power lines near where he landed.

This jumper was jumping a elliptical canopy at a 1.4:1 wing-loading, which the manufacturer recommends for jumpers of intermediate experience level. The manufacturer does not list the number of jumps or experience required to be considered an intermediate jumper; however, jumpers at this wing loading should be very competent canopy pilots, which requires staying very current. At 500 jumps total and only 50 jumps in the past 12 months, this jumper's experience may have been a factor in the accidental low turn. Highly wing-loaded elliptical canopies will lose a large amount of altitude during a turn, and a jumper must always keep that in mind when flying this type of parachute. The landing pattern needs to be carefully considered, and all turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.

Skydiver's Information Manual Section 5-1 includes recommendations for off-field landings, which specifically warn against making low turns while avoiding obstacles. When faced with an off-field landing, a jumper should carefully scan the selected alternate landing area for any hazards while still high enough to fly to a different location if needed. Once the jumper has selected an alternate site, he should determine a descent strategy based upon the wind speed and direction, as well as the specific challenges of the area.

A braked approach and landing can provide for a slower, safer descent into an unfamiliar landing area. Jumpers should practice braked canopy flight and landings often to become familiar with flying a canopy at slower forward speeds and descent rates. All jumpers can benefit from canopy training beyond the basic instruction taught to student skydivers. Many professional canopy schools offer this type of training, and SIM Sections 6-10 and 6-11 include useful information and canopy drills designed to improve the skills and knowledge of each jumper who works through the training outline with an experienced canopy coach.

A Board of Inquiry was instigated, which consisted of John Page, Vice-Chairman of STC and Instructor Examiner and Mark Bayada, Instructor Examiner. They arrived at the site within three hours.

The Conclusions of the Board are that the deceased made an uneventful free fall descent, deployed his main parachute at a suitable altitude, remained ‘up wind’ of the intended landing area until he commenced the final ‘down wind leg’ of the descent. At a low altitude, probably below 150ft AGL he initiated a radical 120-degree right turn in order to face into wind for landing. He then struck the ground at high speed before the parachute was able to recover from the turn.

The Board do not know why he made such a radical turn so close to the ground.

It was noted that this descent may have been only the fourth he had made as a display parachutist. Logged descents indicate he had not fulfilled the requirements for currency according to the BPA Operations Manual.

The Recommendations of the Board are that parachutists should be reminded of the dangers of performing radical manoeuvres close to the ground, and that Team Leaders are reminded that it is their responsibility to ensure team members meet the currency requirements prior to making a display descent.

Following some discussion, it was proposed by Stuart Meacock and seconded by Ray Armstrong that the Board of Inquiry Report into the death, including the Conclusions and Recommendations be accepted.

A witness under canopy above this jumper observed him turn approximately 180 degrees before he struck the ground. Investigators believe he initiated the turn at an extremely low altitude, although there were no witnesses in a position to accurately gauge the altitude.

Since there was no wind when this jumper's load took off, all seven skydivers on the plane agreed to land facing west unless the wind picked up from a different direction. A few minutes after they were under canopy, the wind increased slightly to a few miles per hour from the southeast. This jumper initially faced into the new wind direction during his landing approach but turned toward the northwest right before he struck the ground. He may have planned his final approach to land facing into the wind but changed his mind at the last minute in an attempt to face the direction initially agreed upon. There were no obstacles in the immediate area that should have influenced his decision about the landing direction.

The report described this jumper as a conservative canopy pilot who was not known to have attended any structured canopy training course or to have ever worked with a more experienced canopy pilot on canopy skills. The evidence seems to indicate this was a case of a turn initiated too low in an attempt to land in the agreed-upon direction; however, it is difficult to come to determine the reason for the jumper's final turn at such a low altitude.

Light, shifting winds can lead to jumpers on the same load landing in different directions as each jumper chases the wind sock or streamer when it changes direction. Wind speeds of just a few miles per hour will not greatly affect the landing flare, and it is almost always safer for jumpers on the same load to fly the same canopy pattern than for them to use a variety of approaches while attempting to follow a shifting wind sock. Smaller flags and wind streamers easily change direction with the slightest breeze, which can lead to confusion for jumpers under canopy trying to determine a wind orientation for their final approach and landing. A large tetrahedron can help establish a landing direction for all wind conditions, as it is unaffected by light winds and will stay pointing in one direction unless the wind speed increases beyond three or four miles per hour from another bearing.

Many structured canopy courses include discussions on a large variety of landing conditions, including traffic management in variable winds; course training exercises typically include at least one crosswind landing in a controlled environment as well. Skydiver's Information Manual Sections 6-10 and 6-11 include information and practice exercises that can help jumpers learn more about canopy flight through any course led by an experienced canopy coach.

Regardless of wind direction or speed, it is safer to land a parachute that is flying straight with the wing level than it is to initiate a low turn to attempt to land into the wind. Ultimately, all turns must be completed with enough altitude for the canopy to return to straight and level flight for the landing flare.

There were a total of four tandem pairs in the air on the load; two of them, including this one, were relatively close together on final approach. Jumpers on the ground waited as each pair landed to catch the tandem canopies (i.e. to collapse the parachutes). This tandem pair was at approximately 200 feet above the ground and had passed over top of the catchers when investigators believe the instructor decided to make a 360-degree turn to shorten his final approach and land closer to the waiting catchers. However, once he was halfway through the turn, the altitude lost during the turn placed him and his student at the same level as a second tandem pair who had been behind and below them and were facing into the wind.

The two tandems were now facing each other. The second tandem instructor stated that the first tandem pair passed by in a downwind direction and that the first instructor was looking directly at him as he went by. As soon as the first tandem passed the second tandem pair, this tandem instructor initiated a hard 180-degree turn, most likely to try to face into the wind for landing. However, by the time he had passed the facing traffic of the second tandem pair, he had descended to approximately 50 feet, which was much too low to complete a 180-degree turn. This tandem and their canopy struck the ground at nearly the same time, with the canopy still in a steep diving turn.

As with many fatalities, several factors combined to lead to a fatal outcome. Take away any one of the factors, and the outcome may have changed.

This was the fourth load of the day at the DZ. Earlier in the day, winds had been above 22 mph, which the drop zone uses as a cutoff point for all jump operations. The pilot and DZ staff monitored the wind as the day progressed, and jumping started once the wind had been below 20 mph for 20 minutes. On each jump, following standard procedures for the drop zone, the pilot checked the wind speed with ground operations in case the winds had picked up after takeoff and increased beyond the 22-mph limit. During this jump run, the wind meter on the ground indicated 15 mph, and the weather reporting station indicated eight knots around the time of the skydive, with a gust to 20 knots at some point in a 10-minute range.

Once this tandem instructor initially realized he was going to land well beyond the waiting catchers on the ground, a better option may have been to remain facing into the wind and land with the canopy flying straight and level rather than making aggressive turns close to the ground to land closer to his intended target. Even if the tandem catchers would not have been able to reach the pair as they landed, the instructor could have disconnected the reserve static line and pulled the cutaway handle after landing to release the main canopy and avoid being dragged by the main in the strong winds.

Even after the instructor had decided to make the subsequent attempt at a 360-degree turn, only to pause for traffic halfway through the turn, a better decision may have been to keep the canopy flying straight and level and land in a downwind direction—or possibly turn slightly and land somewhat crosswind—rather than initiate another drastic turn so close to the ground. While landing downwind isn’t ideal in 15-plus mph winds, the pair would have had the chance to land with little downward speed and most likely been able to slide in the landing, which would provide less chance of an injury than landing in a turn at a high rate of descent.

Jumping in strong and/or gusty winds has led to many injuries and several fatal landings in the past. Experienced jumpers, solo students, and tandem instructors and their students have all suffered fatal accidents on jumps that took place in conditions where strong winds, gusty winds or a combination of both played a factor in the outcome. Tandem instructors often jump in winds of 15 to 20 mph without incident, especially if the winds are steady and remain smooth throughout the canopy descent and landing. Still, all tandem instructors need to carefully consider the weather conditions along with the many other factors that must be taken into account while jumping in tandem with students.

While the majority of skydivers manage to land uneventfully when jumping in strong or erratic winds, every jumper, including tandem instructors, needs to consider the additional risks that come with skydiving in these conditions.